1 week ago
By Neeraj Singh Manhas
The India-China standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh has entered its fourth winter. Meanwhile, bilateral relations have remained in an “abnormal state” since the 2020 Galwan clashes. Bringing back normalcy could be a long and complex process, as issues of divergence between the two countries go beyond the disputed border due to water disputes which have been a topic of significant contention for a prolonged period.
Water resources are commonly perceived as a communal asset that ought to be utilised for the collective good. However, in actuality, the growing supply-demand gap in water availability has the potential to rapidly escalate into a contentious issue among the riparian countries. The exacerbation of tensions over water resources in India and China can be attributed to their intricate political relations and persistent border conflicts.
Dams Galore
The construction of dams and hydropower projects by China on the Brahmaputra River (Yarlung Zangbo) has generated apprehension in India regarding the possible ramifications on water flow downstream. Over 87,000 dams have been built across China, including in Tibet — a significant number of these dams are situated on India-shared international waterways.
India is reviving its 12 hydropower projects, which are expected to generate 11,517 megawatts of energy along the border and cost around $15.3 billion. On the Chinese side, a ‘super dam’ is under construction on Tibet’s Yarlung Tsangpo. The Indian government has made allegations against China for insufficient sharing of hydrological data about the upstream region of transboundary rivers, thereby aggravating the tensions between the two nations.
Riparian Relations
The contested LAC, which is nearly 3,440 km long, and its shifting nature as a result of rivers, lakes and snow-caps have led to confrontations at various spots. India and China’s riparian ties and their border conflict cannot be delinked, the fact that their close geographic proximity and overlapping territories often affect both these issues. The shared geographical backdrop of the disputed border regions and the rivers that originate from those areas provide the link between the two, and this is where the connection can be found.
Many people in these border areas are dependent on agriculture and pastoralism for their livelihoods. The fragile ecosystems of the Himalayas are particularly vulnerable to such pressures, which leads to long-term changes in water availability and quality for downstream states. In the context of riparian relations, the upper riparian states always assert that they have the ‘absolute territorial sovereignty’ to use rivers for their own purposes without consulting the lower riparian states. This can be seen in the case of the Nile River basin, Mekong River basin and Indus River basin. The lower riparian states, on the other hand, uphold the idea of ‘absolute territorial integrity’ of rivers, while highlighting that the acts of the upper riparian states should not hurt the flow of water farther downstream.
China is in a position to exercise control over water resources owing to its “fortunate position” since it is located in upper riparian region
Water Laws
It is important to note that China was one of the three nations that did not accept the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1997. China’s reasons for not accepting the UN Convention are complex and multifaceted. This indicates that China does not wish to be bound by international accords on the distribution of water resources. Also, China does not have any formal water-sharing arrangements with the countries in its immediate vicinity. Instead, China tends to perceive water as a strategic resource and a tool for use in the formation of its policies regarding the surrounding regions.
China is in a position to exercise control and leverage over the water resources it commands as a result of its “fortunate position” as a nation located in an upper riparian region. The lower riparian states can also have a command over a relatively less powerful upper riparian nation. This can be a powerful deterrent, as the upper riparian states will be reluctant to do anything that could jeopardise their water supply.
India is located in a middle riparian location, which makes it more reliant on the headwaters of rivers like the Brahmaputra, Indus and Sutlej, all of which are fed by the Tibetan plateau. Because of this dependence, India is at a greater risk of experiencing water scarcity. The rivers and their resources are more difficult to manage as a result of this territorial dispute. The Indus and the Sutlej flow on the western side, while the Brahmaputra flows on the eastern side. Chinese hydrologists, however, claim that the Brahmaputra has a sufficient supply of water and would not have a substantial impact on India.
Furthermore, India’s concerns continue to centre on the release of floodwater during the monsoon season rather than a lack of available water. However, most rivers become fatter after they are joined by tributaries and fed by precipitation in the plains, according to data. This is because the tributaries add more water to the river, and the precipitation in the plains also adds to the river’s flow.
Working Together
The potential for cooperation between India and China on the Brahmaputra River must primarily focus on reducing the severity of floods and investigating the possibility of jointly producing hydroelectric power. It is important to have hydrological data that is accurate and collected consistently for efficient transboundary water arrangements.
The importance of India and China working together to improve the channels for sharing data and generating data is mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2002 and renewed in 2008, 2013 and 2018. Similarly, an MoU on the Sutlej River was signed in 2004 and updated in 2010 and 2015. Under these MoUs, China shares real-time data with India on water levels, discharge and rainfall from hydrological stations along the two rivers during the flood season (June-October). India uses this data to better manage its water supplies and reduce the risk of flooding. Though both MoUs expired in 2023, China continues to provide data on Sutlej. The two countries are now in the process of renewing their MoUs.
It is necessary to make diplomatic efforts, engage in constructive discourse and have the political will to find solutions that are mutually acceptable to resolve water and border problems.
International mediation, implementation of confidence-building measures and drafting of agreements are essential to successfully resolve conflicts. Both countries must handle concerns linked to water in a transparent manner to restore confidence and ease tensions.
(The author is Special Advisor, South Asia, at Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. Views are personal)
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